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FILED

DANTEL L-SPICXLER
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney

Erik L. Johnson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Post Office Box I267
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone (208) 799-3073
I.S.B.N. 5995

M THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF T E
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TJAE COUNTY OF M Z PERCE
JERRY VAVOLD,

1
1
1

Petitioner,
vs

Case No. CV2007-2472

)

.

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION

)

1
Respondent.
COMES NOW, Respondent, State of Idaho, by and through its attorney of recosd, Erik L.
Johnson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Nez Perce County, and moves this Court for

Summary Disposition and Dismissal of rhe Petitioner's Application for Post-Conviction Relief as
a matter of law pursuant to Idaho Code 5 19-4906(c): This niotion is supported by the attached
Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition, incorporated herein by reference.
DATED this

day of December, 2007.

n

h
Erik L. Jo son
Deputy P osecuting Attorney

/

Vmold v. Sture

MORON FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I declare under penalty of perjury that a f%ll and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION
FOR SUMMARY RISPOSrI'ION was sent via U,S. Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the
following:
Jerry Vavold

IDOC No. 58904
P.O. Box 14
Boise, ID 83707
D A E D this

day of December, 2007.

Vavold v. State
MOnON FOR SUMMhRY DISPOSITION

D W L L.SPlCKLER
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Ammey

Erik L. Johnson
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Post Offlce Box 1267
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone (208) 799-3073

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TKE
STATE OF IDARO, I
N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
JERRY VAVOLD,

Petitioner,
VS.

STATE OF IDAHO,

1

Case No. CV2007-2472

)
)
) RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT
)
OF MOTION FOR
)
SUMMARY DISPOSITION

1
)

Respondent.

1

Comes now, Erik L. Johnson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Nez Perce Couaty, State
of Idaho, and respectfdly submits the following Brief in Support of Motion for Sumnary
Disposition,

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDUkAL IFISTOW
Jerry Vavold pled guilty to lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen, Idaho Code 3 I. 8-

1508, a felony. 0p November 17, 1999 the Court sentenced McCormack to five (5) years .to
twenty (20) years in the custady of the Idaho Board of Corrections. Vavold filed a Rule 35
n~otionto reconsider his seatence, which this Court denied on March 6,2000. Vavold appealed
on the Rule 35 issues. The Idaho Court of Appeals affmed the conviction and sentence on
Octubw 27,2000.
KESPONDFNYS BRlEF
M SUPPORT OP MOTION
FOR SWMhfARY DISPOSITION

Vavofd filed the present petition for post conviction relief on November 26,2007
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Vavold alleges that his right to counsel and right to
remain silent at a court ordered evaluation were violated pursuant to Esfradz v. State, 149 P.3d
833 (Idaho 2006). Vavold seeks to have the Court order an evidentiq hearing and a
"responsive pleading process."

APPLICABLE STANDARDS
A Petition for Post-Conviction relief is brought pursuanl to Idaho Code Sections 19-4901

through 19-4911. The application is a special proceeding which is civil in nature and distinct
from the criminal proceeding. State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676 (1983); Stare v. January, 127
Idaho 634 (Ct. App. 1995). A post-conviction proceeding must comply with various procedural
rules outlined in Idaho Code 19, Chapter 49. Sunmq dismissal of an application pursuant to
I

I

Idaho Code $ 19-4906 is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under Idaho Rule of

1.I

Civil Procedure 56. Medrano v. State, 127 Idaho 693 ((3.App. 1995). Like a plaintiff in a civil

I

action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the auegations upon which

!

the request for post-conviction relief is based. Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813 (Ct. App. 1995).

j

To withstand summary dismissal in a post-conviction relief proceeding, it is incumbent

I
I

I

upon the applicant to tender a factual showing based upon evidence that would be admissible itt a
hearing. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612 (Ct. App. 1982). An application for post-conviction
relief must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and

I

I

affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the
application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with the petition. M e h o ,

I

I

127 Idaho at: 642-43. In other words, the application must present or be accompanied by

i

admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to is missal. Id
Vuvold v. State

WSPONDENT'S BRIEF
tN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION

r

'J

n C h 'Ah!

Section 19-4901 ofthe Idaho Code specifically states two requirements that a petitioner
must meet in order to bring a claim for post conviction relief, First, the petitioner must be
convicted of or sentenced for a crime. Second, the petitioner must claim either (1) the conviction
or sentence was unconstitutional, (2) the court was without jurisdiction, (3) the sentence exceeds
a legal maximum, (4) the existence of material evidence previously unheard, (5) the expiration of
sentence or unlawful revocation of probation, (6) the defendant is innocent, or (7) the conviction
or sentence is othenvise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error heretofore
available under any common law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or
remedy. LC. $ 19-4901(a). The state bases its motion to dismiss upon the following grounds:
(1) the petition is untimely, and (2) the petition contains conclusory allegations lacking
supporting evidence.
ARGUMENT

1.

The Petition is Untimely.

Idaho Code $ 19-4902 provides that "[aln application may be filed at any time within ane
(1) year &om The expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from

the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." "[Tlhe time linlit to
file an application under the UPCPA is not renewed or extended by any ... collateral post-

judgment proceeding." FI-eernanv. State,122 Idaho 627,629 (Ct. App. 1992).
As noted above*the Petitioner was sentenced on November 17, 1999. Vavold appealed
his conviction and sentence, which was upheld by the Idaho Court of Appeals in an opinion filed

October 27,2000. Yavold had 42 days from that date, or until December 8,2000, to file a
W h e r appeal, which was not done. He then had one year from that date, or until December 8,
2001, to f i e apost-conviction claim. See LC. 5 19-4902.
Vevoldv. Stale

RESPONDENT'SBNEE
PJSUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION

A recent post-conviction case in Nez Perce County District Court aftirms that a postconviction petition based on Estrada filed outside the one year time limit is procedurally barred.
In Harselt v. State, the petitioner filed his petition based on Eslvada twelve years after the
allowable time frame. Nez Perce County Case No. CV07-1348. The District Court f m d that .
Hassett's petition "is without question untimely." Id. at 6. The present petition was filed nearly

six years outside of the time frame for filing a post-conviction application and is therefore
procedurall~time-barred.
2.

The Petition Contains Conciusory Allegations and Lacks Evidence

Section 19-4903 of the Idaho Code specifically states that "[alffidavits, records, or other
evidence supporting [the petition's] allegations shall be attached to the application or the
application shall recite why they are not attached." Case law adheres to this section by citing to
it and reiterating its language. Nielson v. State, 121 Idaho 779 (Ct. App. 1992); Bnruth v.

Gardner, 110 Idaho 156 (Ct. App. 1986). These decisions held that petitions that do not have
such affidavits, records, or other evidence attached, and give no explanation as to why they are
not attached, are l~nsupportedallegations. Id Such unsupported allegations entitle the court to

summarily dispose ofthe application for post-conviction relief. Nielson, 121 Idaho at 780.

No material issue of fact is presented by an application for post-conviction relief that
contains nothing more than mere assertions. Nielson, supra. Mere assertions stem from
allegations being made without supporting documentation (as discussed above), or when the
allegations are conclusory in nature. fa! Applications for post-conviction relief that contain only
conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any fact, are insufficient to entitle a petitioner to an
evidentiary hearing and thus, such unsupported allegations entitle the court to summarily dispose
of the application. Id
Vavold v. Stare
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

In his affidavit,

Vavold states that the sentencingjudge relied on the evaluation and the

statements that he made and that he was given a harsher sentence because of the evaluation.
However, Vavold does not mention what statements he refers to nor how these statements
resulted in a harsher sentence. His affidavit contains mere conclusory allegations and
insinuations without supporting evidence,

CONCLUSION
Vavold's petition was filed nearly six y m s outside of the time frame allowed by Idaho
Code $I 19-4902 and is therefore procedurally barred. As to aQtVavold's allegations, the petition
contains conclusory allegations without suppotting evidence or documentation or an explanation
why such evidence is not attached. such unsupported allegations entitle the Court to summarily
dispose of the petition, The Respondent requests that the Court grant its motion for summary
disposition and dismiss Mr. Vavold's petition for post-conviction relief.
sJr

DATED &is c/,\day of December, 2007

P

Deputy Pr secuting Attorney

Vavoldv. State

ESPONDENT'S BNEF
M SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION
nun^
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I declare under penalty of perjury that a M ,true, complete and correct copy of the
foregoing BREF TN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION was sent via
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the f o l l o ~ i ~ g :
Jerry Vavold
D O C No, 58904
P.O. Box 14
Boise, ID 83707

DATED this

Vavold v. State
RESPONDENT'S BNEF
INSUPPORT OFMOTION
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION

day of December, 2007

FILED
PATTY 0.KEEKS

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
JERRY V. VAVOLD,
Petitioner,

)
)

Case No.:

CV07-2472

! ORDER
\

i

vS .

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent

)

1
)

Jerry V. Vavold having filed a Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief on November 26, 2007, without having requested the
appointment of counsel; Respondent State of Idaho having filed a
Motion for Summary Disposition and Supporting Brief on December
24, 2007;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioner Jerry V. Vavold shall file

a Motion to Appoint Counsel with accompanying affidavit of
financial status with the Court by January 18, 2008, if he
desires the Court to consider appointment of counsel. It is
further ordered that, if Petitioner does not wish to seek
appointment of counsel, any opposition to the State of Idaho's
Motion for Summary Disposition be submitted by February 1, 2008.

ORDER

Dated this 31St day of December, 2 0 0 7 .

ORDER

ORDER - 2

'2

>L

9

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER was:
hand delivered via cowt basket, or
mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston. Idaho, t h i s 2 day of December
2007, to:

Erik Johnson
Lewiston, ID 83501
J e q Vavold
IDOC #58904
PO Box 14
Boise, ID 83707-0014

ORDER

FILED

Teresa A. Harnpton
Idaho Bar No. 4364
HAMPTON & ELLIOTT
Attorneys at Law
912 N. 8" Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
Voice: 2081384-5456
Pacsiniile: 20813 84-5476

PATTY 0. WEEKS

Mailing Address:
P.O. Box 1352
Boise. ID 83701
Attorneys for Petitioner

INTE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

1

JERRY V. VAVOLD,
Petitioner,

1
1
)

VS.

)

1

STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NO. CV-2007-2472

)

MEMORANI>UM I
N RESPONSE
TO THE STATES MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISMISSAL

1
Respondent. )

The Petitioner, Serry Vavold, through counsel of record, submits this Memorandum in
Response to the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal in accordance with the Court's Order of,
December 31, 2007. This Menlorandm is supported by a Motion to Take Judicial Notice and
Affidavit of Jerry Vavold filed contemporaneously.
Factual Background and Procedural History

Petitioner does not generally contest the factual background or procedural history section
contained in the State's Brief in Support Of Motion for Summary Dismissal (herein*

refemd to

as State's Brief). Mr. Vavold appealed his sentence and included the issues of whether the PSI
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conraining unreliable hearsay influenced the sentence, whether the sentence was unreasonable and
the denid of the motion for reconsideraxion. Mr. Vavold poinrs out a typographical error of the
reference to "McCormack" as the defendant.

Standards for Post-Conviction Action
A petition for post-conviction relief is civil in nature and the petitioner must prove by a

preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is
based. Marriaez v. fiate, 143 Idaho 789,791 (Ct. App. 2007). The application must be verified and
accompanied by affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations or indicate why the
supporting information is not included. Idaho Code 519-4903.

A petition is subject to summary dismissal only when the applicant's evidence presents no
genuine issue of material fact !%at would entitle the petitioner to relief if resolved in his favor. An
evidentiq hearing must be held if genuine issues of material fact are raised. Marrinea v. Stare, 143
Idaho at 791.

Response to hgument
The State seeks summary dismissal on two grounds: 1) the petition is untimely and; 2) the
petition lacks evidence to support the claim. State's Brief, p. 3. Mr. Vavold asserts the petition is a
timely application raising the issue of right to counsel and Fiflh Amendment Privileges as
announced in Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558 (filed Noveniber 24,2006, released for publication
January 22, 2007), (certiorari denied 2007 LEXIS 10333 (October 1, 2007). Further, sufficient
E a c a allegations were presented in the Verified Petition and as supplemented by this Response to

preclude summary disposition.
1. Timely Petition.

The State's Motion for Summary Dismissal is predicated only upon Idaho Code $19-4902.
his perition was not filed under the strict time constraints of Idaho Code
Mr. Vavold concedes r h a ~

5 19-4902. The Petition is timely filed under a new rule of law that should be xetroactively applied.
Mr. Vavold Bed his pro se Petition for Post-conviction Relief on November 21, 2007,

pursuant to the mailbox rule. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988). The Petition raised the limited
claims of violaxion of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel at the
psychosexual evaluation stage of the trial proceedings and violation of the Fifth Amendment right
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against self-incrimination at the psychosexual evaluation. Petition, p. 2. Mr. Vavold specifically
cited 10 the Estrada decision iu his Petition. A fair reading of the Petition results in a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure of counsel to explain or assert M. Vavold's Fifth and

Sixth Aniendrnent rights at the evaluation. Gr@n v. State, 142 Idaho 438,441 (Ct. App. 2006).
Typically, a petition for post-conviction relief must be filed within one year of either the
conclusion of an appeal or expiration of the time for appeal, whichever is later. Idaho Code $194902. However, under the limited facts of this case, hh.Vavold's P&it.ion

i s timely filed as it is

filed within one year of the Esfrada decision announcing a new rule of law, the earliest bigger date
for the one yea* filing requirement. Arguably, Mr. Vavold would havc until the dcnial of the
petition for writ of certiorari in which to file his Petition.

In Estrada, the Idaho Supreme Court announced a netv ~ l ofelaw with regard to the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination because the Court held that "no rdaho

Supreme Court or United States Supreme Court case has specifically articulated a Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination as it applies to psychosexual evaluations Gar
may support a harsher sentence in a mu-capital case.. .." Esirada, 143 Idaho at 564. It also
announced the extension of the right to counsel by finding the psychosexual examination
required by Idaho Code 3 18-8316 is a critical stage of the proceedigs entitling a defendant
to the advice of counsel regarding participation in the evaluation. Estvada, 143 Idaho at

562.
Although the Court stated case law indicated that the Fifth Amendment right applies to
psychosexual evaluations, an indication is not a dictated result. A result is not dictated by
precedent just because "the result the habeas petitioner seeks is within the logical compass of a
prior Supreme Coulf decision" or because "prior Supreme Court decisions inform, or even
control or govern>the analysis of the claim." Spaziano v. Singletcoy, 36 F.3d 1028, 1042.(11tlt.
Cir. 1994) (internal quotations and citations omitted). For these purposes, a result is dictated by
precedent only if the court considering the claim at the time the conviction became final "would
have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [the defendant] seeks

was

required by the Constitution." Glock v. Singletary, 65 F.3d 878, 884 (I lth Cir. 1995) (internal
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quotation marks omitted). It is not a dictated result if the case's outcome was "susceptible to
debate among reasonable minds." Bid.
Typically, a newly annomced rule of law will apply to those cases pending on direct appeal,
that is, the rule will not be applied retroactively to cases in which a conviction became final before
announcement of the rule. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,311 (1989). There are two exceptions to
the non-retroactive application of new rules: (1) the rule announces a substantive rule of criminal
law or (2) the rule is a "watershed rule of c f i 1 procedure implicating the fundamental fairness
and accuracy of the criminal proceeding." Whorfon v. Bockring,

- U.S. --.127 S. Ct. 1173, 1180

(2007). A new rule rising to the stature of a watershed rule must fiz wirhin a m o w exception. It
must prevent an impermissibly large risk of inaccurate conviction or sentence and must alter the
understanding of the bedrock proccduraI elements essential to the fairness of the proceeding.

Whorfonat 1182; Schviro v. Suwmevlin, 542 U.S. 348,357 (2004).
While the United States Supreme C o w has rarely applied new rules retroactively, Schriro v.

Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, the exception is the right to counsel.

I

I
1
I

!

i

1

I

Every extension of the right to counsel from Gideon through Argersingev has
been applied retroactively to collateral proceedings by the [United States]
Supreme Court. The holding of Gideon itself, which established the right to
counsel in all felony convictions, 372 U.S. at 344-45, 83 S. Ct. at 796-97, was
judged to be retroactively applicable in Kitchens v. Smith, 401 U.S. 847, 847, 91
S. Ct. 1089, 1090,28 L. Ed. 2d 519 (1971). The right to counsel at plea hearings,
recognized in White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 S. Ct. 1050, 10 L. Ed. 2d 193
(1963), was held to be retroactively applicable in Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393
U.S. 5,6, 89 S. Ct. 35,36,21 L. Ed. 2d 5 (1968). The right to counsel at probation
revocation hearings, announced in Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S. Ct. 254,
19 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1967), was held.to be retroactively appIicable in McConnell v.
Rhay, 393 U.S. 2, 3-4, 89 S. Ct. 32, 33-34, 21 L. Ed. 2d 2 (1968). Tile right to
counsel on appeal, recognized in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S. Ct.
814, 9 L. Ed. 2d 81 1 (1963), has also been retroactively applied. See McConnelI,
393 U.S. at 3, 89 S. Ct. at 33. Finally, Augersinger's extension of the right to
counsel to any prosecution leading to actual imprisonment was deemed
retroactively applicable in B e r v v. City of Cincinnati, 414 U.S. 29, 29-30, 94 S.
Ct. 193, 194,38 t.Ed. 2d 187 (1973). A score that is perfect packs punch in any
analysis.
Howardv United States, 374 F.3d 1068, 1078 (1 lth Cir. 2004) (discussion ofwatershed rules).
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Likewise, the Idaho Suprenle Court's decision to extend the right to counsel to the critical
stage of a psychosexual evaluation is retroactively applicable and should be applied to Mr. VavoId.
Additionally, the newly extended Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination also applies
to Mr. Vavold. The Petition is timely filed.
2. Facts supporting claim.

In the affidavit in support of the Petition, Mr. Vavold averred that he did not waive the right
to counsel and requested counsel and was denied counsel at the evaluation. He averred that his
sentence was harsher because of the evaluation. Affidavit of Facts in Support of Post-Conviction, p.

1. In support of this Memorandum, Ivlr.Vavold states that he provided derails regarding his sexual
histoly to the evaluator and fhose were used to f o m conclusions. Affidavit o f J e w Vavold.
The district court: ordered a sexual abuse evaIuation in preparation for sentencing. Case No.
CR 98-04465, Court Minutes, September 22, 1999 (Attachment 1). A trwcript of the sentencing

hearing was prepared and a copy lodged with &e court as part ofthe Clerk's Record and Transcript

in Case No. CR 98-04465.'
During the sentencing hearing, the court stated it had "very carefully" reviewed the sex
offendcr risk assessment evaluation prepared by Dr. Jeny Doke. Tr. 7, 1. 13 - 20. At argument,
defense counsel requested the court sentence Mr. Vavold to r e h e d jtrisdiction. Tr. 15, I. 10. The
State argued that "[biased on the information contained in the PSX and Dr. Doke's repo*$ it is
apparent that incarceration is an appropriate sentence in this matter." Tr. 22,l. 12.
The court found rhat while it believed Mr. Vavold would do well on a retained jurisdiction,

his was not an appropriate case for the program. Tr. 27, 15 - 19. The court specifically held that
there was an indication of future conduct based upon the sex offender evaluation. Faced with Mr.
Vavold's past record and the future indications &om the evaluation, the court weighed heavily the
protection of sociely. Tr. 28, 1. 16. Thc court sen~ncedMi. VavoId to five years determinate and

15 years indeterminate for a total of 20 years.
From the court's sentencing determination, it is clear that the court carehlly reviewed and
relied upon the sex offender evaluation to reject the retained jurisdiction sentencing option and
A copy of rhe uanscript was prepared and lodged as part of the record on appeal. A copy has not been reproduced.
Insread, a motion to rake judicial notice of the file in Case No. CR 99-04465 requens rhe coun ro consider those
nanscripu, and pleadings in lieu o f filing.
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instead impose a sentence of five to twenty years incarceration. This establishes a sufficient factual
basis ~opreclude summary dismissal.

Conclusion

Mt. Vavold respectfully requests the court apply the new rule of Estvada to his case and find
the facts asserted in the Petition and in the supporting Affidavit present a sufficient basis to deny

summary dismissal. He requests leave to conduct discovery and a hearing on the claims set forth in
the Petition.

DATED this

/

*

-.

day of Fehiuay, 2008.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

sf
he

I hereby cerrify that on the
day of February, 2008, I served a W e and correct copy
of the within and foregoing document upon tlze attomey(s) named below in the manner noted:

Daniel L. Spickler
New Perce County Prosecuting Attomey
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, ID 83501
Facsimile: (208) 799-3080

LC

By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage
at the post office at Boise, Idaho.

-

By hand delivering copies of the same to the office(s) of the attomey(s)
indicated above.

-

By faxing copies of same to said attorneyv) 3t the facsimile number(s)
indicated above.
I
j
I

<\

:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, I
N AND FOR THE COWTY OF hTEZ PFRCE
COURT MINUTES
Presiding Judge
RON SCBIL'LXNG
Reporter
DAVE HOW ELL
Date SEPTEMBER 22,1999
Time 9:45

1

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

J

Plaintiff,

)

Docket No. CR 96-OW63

I

)

VS.

>

.A.PPE?,UHCES:

1

MIKE SF@

1

For, Plainriff

)

1
1
SVBlECT OF PROCEEDlNGS:

ANTHONYAXEGON
For, Defendant.

CHANGE OF PLEA

BE IT KNOWN, THAT THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO-WIT:
DC# 2622 3455 2623 001-812 Defendant present with counseI. Others present Ebr change of plea
rights: MacDonald Riggs and Michael Hight.
Court advises Defendant ofclrange of plea procedure. Coilrt addresses Znfonliatian.
DC# 2633 064 Defendant indicates name, date ofbirth, & SS?? are correct on Infomlation
064 Cous advises Defendant of rights
286 Court questions Defendant.
294 Court addresses Information.

1
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2

'Pages

COURT MINUTES
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ATTACHMENT 1

CR

JERRY VAVOLD

98-04465

Couct advises Defendant of maximum possible penalties.
326 Defendant enters guilty plea,
364 State sumniarizes evidence
41 3 COUITquestio~?~
Mr. Aneson.

Mr. Anegon responds.
477 Coult questions Defendant.
Defendant responds.
Couit sets sen~el~cing
on Nov. 17, 1999, at 10:45 a.in. 'ouri
c\~aluationbe sub~nirtedby Nov. 12, 1999.

orders psi repor1 and sexiial abuse

Coilit orders S ~ e p l ~ Lindsley
en
ro perfom? the evaluatioii.

613 Court conti~iuesquestioning Defendant
782 Defendanr enters guilty plea again
762 Coun presents comn~ellts.

SO2 Court accepts guilty plea

812 ~ o u G
in recess.

BARBARA KASPER

APPROVED:

Deputy Clerk
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Presiding udge

FILED
Teresa k Wpton
Id& Bar No. 4364
llAMPTON $ EL;LEO'fT

PATTY 0.':,'EEI(S

Atforneys at Law
912N. 8* S@&
Boise,Idab 83702
Voice: 2081384-5456

F&ile;

DEPUTY

20&/3i%-5476

Attorneys for Defkdmt
SECOND nn>ICWi D B m C T
COURT OP
OF lPKE STATE OF IDAHO, INAND FOR TEE COUNT'!? OF NEZ PERCE

INTHE DE-
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CASE NO. CV-2007-~72

STATEOFWMO )
) ss:
County ofAda
)

Jerry V. VavoId, being first duly sworn upon o& depom and say.
2. I make ?.his&davit

upon my o w i n f o d mand belid

3. During my rrirninal case, fflejudge ordered the prcpwon ofa &abuse ev&Uatia

hr use at seatencbg.

4. Tha d u a t o r originally &ped wuldnd complete fbe evaluationin time fcnthe

sentmdng. I tbenobtain& an evaluation fmom another psycho109;st, Dr.Jeny Dok to comply
%&Ithe wu1t'5 order.

5. My attamey submiW that evaluationto tae court

6. I was not given a copy of the evaluationaRw my s W @ ,
7. To the best of my recollection, the psychaIogist Ebc!adddetgils ofmy 6idstmy Emd
was used to m

h m1usions in the h e m

8. Further ybur affianf &&not.

DATED ehis 3 1 day of J a n w , 2008.

SUBSCRIBm AND SWORN to before me, this &.

q

day of~duary,2008.
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OF SERVICE
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Daniel L. .SpicMea:
New Pesot Co~nty
Ploswating Attorney
P.O. %% 1267
Lmistoa,ID 83301
Faosimile: (208) 7993080
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By lleposirisgcopies of the same in the United States Md, postage
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' Idiho.

-

By hand delivfzing eopies ofrhe same %'the
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-

ofEica(s) of&
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By J%X& copies o f m e to said attorney$) at the EuxhdIe numbs(s)
In6csxtd above.
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Fj

LED

PATTY 0. VJI'EEKS
COURT

Teresa A. Hampton
Idaho Bar No. 4364
W T O N 65 ELLIOTT
Attorneys at Law
912 N. 8thStreet
Boise, Idaho 83702
Voice: 208/384-5456
Facsimile: 2081384-5476

C~B@IST.

-

DEPUTY

Mailing Address:
P.O. Box 1352
Boise, ID 83701
Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TEE SECOND JWDICIAL DISTRICT
OF TKE STATE OF IDAlfIO, n\r AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
JERRY V. VA\70l;D,

)

CASE NO. CV-2007-2472
Petitioner,

)
)

MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL.NOTICE

)

VS.

1

1

STATE OF IDAHO,

1
Respondent. )
\

Petitioner, Jeny E. Vavold, by and through his attorney of record, Teresa A. Hampton,
moves this Court to take judicial notice of the records, file and pleadings of Bate v. Jervy K Vavold,
Nez Perce County Case No. CR-99-04465.

This motion is based on the records and files herein and the Memorandum in Response to
the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal.
DATED this

1

1

i

day ofFeb111axy, 2008
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certiiy that on the /day

of February, 2008, I served a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing document upon the attorney($ named below in the manner noted:

Daniel L. Spickler
New Perce County Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box I267
Mston,
83501
Facsimile: (208) 799-3080

A"
-

By depositing copies of the same in the United Szaxes Mail, postage
pre-paid, at the post office at Boise, Idaho.

-

By hand delivering copies of the same .to the oEce(s) of the attorney@)
indicated above.
-\
I

By faxing copies of same to said atto
indicated abovc.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
COURT MINUTES
Presiding Judge
JEFF M. BRUDIE
Reporter
LINDA CARLTON
Date February 27,2008
Time 12:25 P.M.
1
JERRY VAVOLD,

1
Petitioner,

)

Docket No. CV 07-02472

\

I

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

VS.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendant.

)

APPEARANCES:
TERESA HAMPTON
For, Petitioner
ERIC JOHNSON
For, Defendant.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION
SUBJECT OF PROCEEDINGS:
DC# 4032 2953 Petitioner NOT present with counsel. Ms. Hampton present by telephone. Mr. Johnson
present. Court has reviewed the CI-iminalfile CR 98-04465, the sentence imposed and the Motion filed.
3095 State presents statement.
3452 Court has reviewed Memo.
3462 Ms. Hampton presents statement.
3675 State has nothing hrther.
2683 Court presents comments. Court takes State's Motion for Summary Disposition under advisement and
will issue a written ruling. Court schedule Eurther proceedings if necessary.
3749 Court has criminal file CR 98-04465 and has not reviewed the PSI or the Sex Offender Risk Evaluation.
The Court will have those documents removed under seal from the file. The Court will not rely on these
documents to render his decision.
3808 Ms. Hampton questions Court re lack of evidence issue.
3827 Court questions State re timeliness issue.
Mr. Johnson respzds.
Court will address tgat issue in written decision.
JANET KOUGH

"

APPROVED:

Deputy Clerk
1
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IN THE DlSTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

JERRY V. VAVOLD,
Petitioner,
v.

1
1
1
1
1
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

1
1

CASE NO. CV07-02472
OPINION AND ORDER
ON STATE'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION

)

This matter is before the Court on State's Motion for Summary Disposition of the Post
Conviction Petition filed by Jerry V. Vavold. The Motion came before the Court for hearing on
February 27,2008. Petitioner Vavold was represented by attorney Teresa A. Hampton.
Respondent State of Idaho was represented by Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Erik L. Johnson.
Prior to the hearing and pursuant to motion by Petitioner, the Court took Judicial Notice of Nez
Perce County Case No. CR99-04465. The Court, having read the Petition, Affidavit, Motion and
briefs of the parties, having heard oral arguments of counsel, and being klly advised in the
matter, hereby renders its decision.

Vavold v Stale
Opinion on Post Conviction Petition

FACTUALANDPROCEDURALBACKGROUND
Petitioner does not dispute the State's rendition of the factual and procedural background
in the case. On September 22, 1999, Petitioner Vavold entered a plea of guilty to one count of
Lewd Conduct with a Minor in violation of I.C. $ 18-1508. Vavold was sentenced on November
17, 1999 to five (5) years to twenty (20) years and placed in the custody of the Idaho Board of
Corrections. A Motion for Reduction of Sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35 was filed by Vavold on
December 20,1999 and a Notice of Appeal of the Judgment of Conviction was filed December
27, 1999. On March 6,2000, the trial Court denied Vavold's Motion for Reduction of sentence.
On October 27,2000, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Vavold's Judgment of Conviction
and the Order denying Vavold's I.C.R. 35 Motion for Reduction of Sentence.
On November 26,2007, Vavold filed the above-entitled post conviction petition asserting
ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner Vavold asserts his Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights under the United States Constitution were violated when his trial counsel failed to advise
him of his right to remain silent at the court ordered psychosexual evaluation. Petitioner cites as
authority Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006).
On December 24,2007, the State filed a Motion for Summary Disposition and brief in
support. On February 1,2008, counsel for Petitioner Vavold filed a Memorandum in Response
to the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal, Affidavit of Jerry V. Vavold and Motion to take
Judicial Notice. The Court heard oral arguments on the State's motion February 27,2008.

POST-CONVICTION RELIEF STANDARD
Under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, a person sentenced for a crime may
seek relief upon making one of the following claims:

Vavold v. State
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(1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the constitutiol~of the
United States or the constitution or laws of this state;
(2) That the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence;
(3) That the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law;
(4) That there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and
heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of
justice;
(5) That his sentence has expired, his probation, or conditional release was
unlawfully revoked by the court in which he was convicted, or that he is otherwise
unlawfully held in custody or other restraint;
(6) Subject to the provisions of section 19-4902@)through (f), Idaho Code, that
the petitioner is innocent of the offense; or
(7) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon
any ground or alleged error heretofore available under any common law, statutory
or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy.
I.C. $ 19-4901(a),
A petition for post conviction relief "may be filed at any time within one (1) year from the
expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the
determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." I.C.

5

19-4902(a)

Petitions for post-conviction relief are a special proceeding distinct from the criminal
action that led to the petitioner's conviction. Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709,711,905 P.2d 642
(Ct.App.1995). "An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in
nature." Fenstermaker v. State, 128 Idaho 285,287,912 P.2d 653 (Ct.App.1995). However,
unlike an ordinary civil action that requires only a short and plain statement of the claim, an
application for post-conviction relief "must be verified with respect to facts within the personal
knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations
must be attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included
with the petition. LC. $ 19-4903." Fenstermaker at 287.
A petitioner in an application for post-conviction relief bears the burden of pleading and

proof imposed upon a civil plaintiff. "Thus, an applicant must allege, and then prove by a
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preponderance of the evidence, the facts necessary to establish his claim for relief." Martinez v.

State, 125 Idaho 844, 846, 875 P.2d 941 (Ct.App.1994).
Under I.C. 3 19-4906, summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief may
occur upon motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. However, "[slummary dismissal
is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact
which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the petitioner to the requested relief.

Fenstermaker at 287. "If the application raises material issues of fact, the district court must
conduct an evidentiary hearing and make specific findings of fact on each issue." Sanchez at
71 1. "It is also the rule that a conclusory allegation, unsubstantiated by any fact, is insufficient
to entitle apetitioner to an evidentiary hearing." Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159,715
P.2d 369 (Ct.App.1986).

ANALYSIS
The State moves for dismissal on the following grounds: (1) petition is untimely; and (2)
petition is based on conclusory allegations unsupported by any evidence. Petitioner, on the other
hand, argues the petition is timely because it was filed within one (1) year ofthe Estrada
decision, which Petitioner contends announced a new rule of law that should be held to have
retroactive application. Petitioner furlher contends the transcript of the sentencing hearing,
prepared for the record on appeal in the criminal case, provides sufficient evidence to factually
support his petition for post conviction relief.
Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) provides in relevant part, "An application may be filed at any
time within one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of
an appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later."
Petitioner Vavold's conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Idaho Court of Appeals on
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October 27,2000. Petitioner filed no post appeal proceedings. Under I.C. 5 19-4902(a), on
October 27,2000, the clock began ticking on Vavold's one-year time period for filing a post
conviction petition. Petitioner concedes that under LC.

19-4902 his petition would be untimely

but, argues it was brought within an allowable time limit where a retroactive new rule of law is
announced in a case.
In Estvada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006), the Court held that "a courtordered psychosexual evaluation constitutes a critical stage of litigation" to which the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel applies. Estrada at 561. The Court held defendants have a right to
at least the advice of counsel regarding participation in the psychosexual evaluation.' Estvada at
562. Once the Court reached its finding on the applicability of the Sixth Amendment, the Court
turned its attention to Estrada's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective. The Court began its
analysis by first determining whether a defendant's Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination can be asserted in a court-ordered psychosexual evaluation. After determining the
Fifth Amendment question, the Court analyzed Estrada's ineffective assistance of counsel claim
under the Strickland test2
Petitioner Vavold contends the Estvada Court announced a new rule of law in regard to
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
and that the new rule of law should be applied retroactively. Petitioner directs the Court to
Spaniiano v. Singletary, 36 F.3d 1028 (1 1" Cir.1994) in support of his argument for retroactive
application of the Estrada ruling.
Of relevance to the instant case is the Spanziano Court's clear understanding that it was
bound by the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109
1

The Estrada Court noted that it had not been asked to decide whether the Sixth Amendment right includes the right
to have counsel physically present during the evaluation and, therefore, that question was left for another day.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052,80 L.Ed2d 674 (1984).
Vavoid v. State
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S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). Relative to the Teague doctrine, the Spanziano Court
stated.
The Teague doctrine bars retroactive application in a 28 U.S.C. 5 2254 [habeas
corpus] proceeding of any rule of law which had not been announced at the time
the petitioner's conviction became final. The Supreme Court has directed that "a
federal court should apply Teague by proceeding in three steps." The first step is
to determine when the defendant's conviction and sentence became final. Id.
Ordinarily, a conviction becomes final for these purposes "when the availability
of direct appeal to the state courts has been exhausted and the time for filing a
petition for a writ of certiorari has elapsed or a timely filed petition has been
finally denied.: Id. . . .
The second step of the Teague analysis is determi~li~lg
whether the rule the habeas
petitioner seeks or upon which he relies is a new one. Caspari, 510 U.S. at ---,
114 S.Ct. at 953. A "new rule" is one that "imposes a new obligation on the
States," or that produces a result "not dictated by precedent existing at the time
the defendant's conviction became final." Id.; Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, ---,
113 S.Ct. 21 12,2116,124 L.Ed.2d 306 (1993); Sawyev v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227,
234,110 S.Ct. 2822,2827, 111 L.Ed.2d 193 (1990); Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, 109
S.Ct. at 1070. Even if the result the habeas petitioner seeks is within the "logical
compass" of a prior Supreme Court decision, Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407,
41 5, 110 S.Ct. 1212, 1217, 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990); even if prior Supreme Court
decisions "inform, or even control or govern, the analysis" of the claim, Safje v.
Parks, 494 U.S. 484,491, 110 S.Ct 1257, 1261, 108 L.Ed.2d 41 5 (1990); Sawyer,
497 U.S. at 236, 110 S.Ct. at 2828; Butler, 494 U.S. at 415, 110 S.Ct. at 1217; it is
still a "new rule" claim unless the rule is actually dictated by pre-existing
precedent.

Spanziano v. Singletary, 36 F.3d at 1042.
As was noted by the Teague Court, "It is admittedly oftell difficult to determine when a
case announces a new rule. . . ." Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. at 301,109 S.Ct. at 1070. Later
decisions by the Supreme Court attempted to assist in the determination by better defining the
term 'new rule'. In Safle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990), the
Court stated.
In Teague, we defined a new rule as a rule that "breaks new ground," "imposes a
new obligation on the States or the Federal Government," or was not "dictated by
precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." Teague,
supua, 489 U.S., at 301, 109 S.Ct., at 1070 (plurality opinion) (emphasis in
Vavold v. State
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original). The explicit overruling of an earlier holding no doubt creates a new
rule; it is more difficult, however, to determine whether we announce a new rule
when a decision extends the reasoning of our prior cases. As we recognized in
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407,412-414, 110 S.Ct 1212, 1216-1217, 108
L.Ed2d 347 (19901, the question must be answered by reference to the underlying
purposes of the habeas writ.

Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. at 488, 110 S.Ct. 1260.
In Butler v. McKeller, 494 U.S. 407, 110 S.Ct. 1212, 1217, 108 L.ed.2d 347 (19901, the
Court discussed the announcement of a new rule relative to the purposes behind collateral
remedies:
A new decision that explicitly overrules an earlier holding obviously "breaks new
ground" or "imposes a new obligation." In the vast majority of cases, however,
where the new decision is reached by an extension of the reasoning of previous
cases, the inquiry will be more difficult. We said in Teague: "'The relevant frame
of reference ... is not the purpose of the new rule whose benefit the [defendant]
seeks, but instead the purposes for which the writ of habeas corpus is made
available.' Mackey [v. Unitedstates, 401 U.S. 667,682,91 S.Ct. 1160, 1175,28
L.Ed.2d 404 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in
part) I.... 'The interest in leaving concluded litigation in a state of repose ... may
quite legitimately be found by those responsible for defining the scope of the writ
to outweigh in some, many, or most instances the competing interest in
readjudicating convictions according to all legal standards in effect when a habeas
petition is filed.' ... Given the 'broad scope of constitutional issues cognizable on
habeas,' ... it is 'sounder, in adjudicating habeas petitions, generally to apply the
law prevailing at the time a conviction became final than it is to seek to dispose of
[habeas] cases on the basis of intervening changes in constitutional
interpretation.' ... '[TIhe threat of habeas serves as a necessary additional incentive
for trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a
manner consistent with established constitutional standards. In order to perform
this deterrence function, ... the habeas court need only apply the constitutional
standards that prevailed at the time the original proceedings took place.' " Teague,
supra, at 306, 109 S.Ct., at 1073 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added; some
brackets in original; some internal citations omitted).

Teague firther observed:"[I]n many ways the application of new rules to cases on
collateral review may be more intrusive than the enjoining of [state] criminal
prosecutions ... for it continually forces the States to marshal resources in order to
keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals conformed to then-existing
constitutional standards. Furthermore, as we recognized in Engle v. Isaac, [456
U.S. 107, 128, n. 33, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1572, n. 33,71 L.Ed.2d783 (1982),] '[sltate
Vavold v. Stale
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courts are understandably frustrated when they faithfully apply existing
constitutional law only to have a federal court discover, during a [habeas]
proceeding, new constitutional commaids.' ... See also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
[443],534,73 S.Ct 397,423,97 L.Ed. 469 [ (1953) ] (Jackson, J., concurring in
result) (state courts cannot 'anticipate, and so comply with, this Court's due
process requirements or ascertain any standards to which this Court will adhere in
prescribing them')." Teague, supra, at 310, 109 S.Ct., at 1075 (plurality opinion)
(emphasis in original; some intemal citations omitted).
The "new rule" principle therefore validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations
of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be
contrary to later decisions. [intemal cites omitted].

Butler v. McKeller, 494 U.S. at 412-414, 110 S.Ct. at 1216-1217.
The Court is not persuaded that Estrada announced a new rule of law. After Estrada's
sentence was affirmed on direct appeal, he timely filed a post-conviction petition. In his petition,
Estrada asserted his trial counsel was deficient for failing to advise him that he could invoke his
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in the court-ordered psychosexual evaluation
despite his plea of guilty to the charge of rape. The district court concluded Estrada had a Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination relative to the psychosexual evaluation and found
his trial counsel was ineffective for failure to so advise Estrada. However, the district court
denied tlie petition after concluding Estrada was not prejudiced by the deficiency and, therefore,
had failed to meet the second prong of the Strickland test.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial but reached its
decision under a slightly different analysis. The Court of Appeals agreed that the privilege
against self-incrimination applies to psycliosexual evaluations ordered by the court. I-Iowever, it
found Estrada had failed to show his trial counsel was ineffective. The Court reasoned that.
because no decision by Idaho's appellate courts or by the United States Supreme Court has held
that a defendant may invoke the right against self-incrimination in court ordered mental health
evaluations conducted for sentencing, Estrada's attorney could not be faulted for failing to advise
Vavold v. State
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his client regarding a privilege that was not clear. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho at 561. While the
language used by the Court of Appeals would suggest a new rule of law, the analysis did not end
with the Court of Appeals decision. Estrada sought and was granted review of his petition by the
Idaho Supreme Court, which saw things very differently.
The Idaho Supreme Court found Estrada's trial counsel was deficient for the following
reasons:
The availability of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
"does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but
upon the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites."
Application ofGault, 387 U.S. 1,49, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1455, 18 L.Ed.2d 527,558
(1967) (noting the privilege may be claimed in a civil or administrative
proceeding if the statement is or may be inculpatory). This Court's decisions
clearly indicate that both at the point of sentencing and earlier, for purposes
of a psychological evaluation, a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination applies. See State v. L a n w d , 116 Idaho 860,871,
781 P.2d 197,208 (1989) ( "The fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination and the sixth amendment right to counsel apply to custodial
psychiatric exams conducted prior to sentencing as well as those conducted prior
to trial."); State v. Wilkins, 125 Idaho 215,217-18, 868 P.2d 1231, 1233-34
(1994) (holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege protects a defendant against
compelled testimony at the sentencing hearing in a non-capital case); State v.
Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 387, 871 P.2d 801, 804 (1994) ("Following Idaho's repeal
of the insanity defense, no statutory scheme remains through which a
psychological evaluation can be compelled without threatening the rights
guaranteed under both [the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and article I, section 13, of the Idaho Constitution]."); State v. Wood, 132 Idaho
88, 100,967 P.2d 702, 714 (1998) (noting that "[ilf a psychiatrist or psychologist
had been appointed by the court for purposes of a presentence investigation,
counsel for Wood wouid have had the opportunity to advise his client of the
possible uses of the information and of the privilege against self-incrimination.").

The district court found that under Strickland, Estrada's attorney was deficient in
failing to inform Estrada of his right to assert the privilege against selfincrimination. The judge's findings on this point are not clearly erroneous and are
affirmed by this Court. Strickland sets an "objective standard of reasonableness"
for judging whether errors in an attorney's performance are serious enough to
render that performance defective. 466 U.S at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d
at 693-94. See also State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 511,988 P.2d 1170, 1185
Vavald v State
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(1999). "There is 'a strong presumption that counsel's performance falls within
the wide range of professional assistance.' " Hairston, 133 Idaho at 51 1,988 P.2d
at 1185 (citing~r&onv. State 114 Idaho 758,760,760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988)).
Under Strickland, "[tlhe proper measure of attorney performance remains simply
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." 466 U.S at 688, 104 S.Ct.
at 2064,80 L.Ed.2d at 693-94. Given the state of the law established by
Estelle, Wilkins, Odiaga, Wood, and Lankford, this Court cannot find that
Estrada's attorney acted reasonably under prevailing standards of
professional norms. See Estelle, 451 U.S. at 470, 101 S.Ct. at 1877,68 L.Ed.2d
at 373-74; Wilkins, 125 Idaho at 217-18, 868 P.2d at 1233-34; Odiaga, 125 Idaho
at 387,871 P.2d at 804; Wood, 132 Idaho at 100,967 P.2d at 714; Lankjord, 116
Idaho at 871,781 P.2d at 208; Strickland, 466 U.S at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064,80
L.Ed.2d at 693-94. While no Idaho Supreme Court or United States Supreme
Court case has specifically articulated a Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination as it applies to psychosexual evaluations that may support a harsher
sentence in a non-capital case, the case law nevertheless indicates that the Fifth
Amendment applies to psychosexual evaluations. We affirm the district court's
conclusion that Estrada's attorney was deficient in failing to inform his client of
this right.

Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho at 563-564 [emphasis added].
The Idaho Supreme Court found that, as early as 1989 in Lankjord and in a number of
cases following Lankford it had clearly established precedent that the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination applies to court ordered psychological evaluations conducted for
sentencing purposes. The Court then found that, because the law was well established at the time
Estrada was ordered to undergo a psychological evaluation, his trial attorney did not act
reasonably under the prevailing standards of professional norms when he failed to advise Estrada
of his right and, as a result, he was ineffective in his representation of Estrada.
The Court finds the Supreme Court's analysis well reasoned. The term 'psychosexual'
evaluation is simply a contracted term used to describe a psychological evaluation that places
emphasis on the sexual psychology of the individual. Hence, the Supreme Court's holding in

Estrada did not announce a new rule of law but instead held that the law in Idaho was clear and
Estrada's attorney was deficient for not having advised his client regarding this well-established
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right. Applying the Estrada Court's analysis to Petitioner Vavold, his claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel was known to him, or should have been known to him, at the time of his
direct appeal and should have been raised at the latest within the one (1) year time frame for post
conviction claims under I.C. § 19-4902(a).~
While this Court is confident Estrada did not announce a new rule of law, the question of
retroactivity will be addressed as though, arguendo, a new rule had been annomced. The

Teague Court held, "[Wle now adopt Justice Harlan's view of retroactivity for cases on collateral
review. Unless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of
criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new
rules are announced." Teague at 310. Under the Teague doctrine, there are only two exceptions
to the general rule that prohibits retroactive application of new rules of law to cases on collateral
review.
The first exception permits the retroactive application of a new rule if the rule
places a class of private conduct beyond the power of the State to proscribe, see
Teague, 489 U.S., at 311, 109 S.Ct., at 1075, or addresses a "substantive
categorical yarante[e] accorded by the Constitution," such as a rule "prohibiting
a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status
or offense." Penry, 492 US., at 329,330, I09 S.Ct., at 2953. . . . .
The second exception is for "watershed rules of criminal procedure" implicating
the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. See Teague,
supra, 489 U.S., at 311, 109 S.Ct., at 1076 (plurality opinion); Butler, supra, 494
U.S., at416, 110 S.Ct., at 1218.

Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. at 494-495, 110 S.Ct. 1263-1264.
The Teague Court fitrlher clarified the second exception by stating, "[Wle believe
that Justice Harlan's concerns about the difficulty in identifying both the existence and the
value of accuracy-enhancing procedural rules can be addressed by limiting the scope of the
second exception to those new procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate
?

Because the Court finds the Petition untimely, it need not address the sufficiency of the evidence on the claim.
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conviction is seriously diminished." Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. at 313, 109 S.Ct. at 1077.
Assuming first for the sake of argument that Estrada announced a new rule of law, the

Estrada holding would not fall within either of the two exceptions that allow for retroactive
application on collateral review. Estrada held a defendant may invoke his Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination relative to a psychological evaluatioil, including a psychosexual
evaluation. It further held a defendant receives ineffective assistance of counsel if his attorney
does not advise him of his right to invoke the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
in a court ordered psychosexual evaluation. The first exception to the general rule requires that a
newly announced rule of law place a class of private conduct beyond the power of the State to
proscribe before it has retroactive application on collateral review. The Estrada holding clearly
fails this test. The second exception to the general rule requires that a new rule of law provide a
watershed rule of criminal procedure "without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction
would be seriously diminished" Teague at 313. The Estrada holding fails this test as well as

Estvada addressed a Constitutional right within the sentencing phase of a criminal case, not the
guilt finding phase.
Under the Teague analysis, Estrada did not announce a new rule of law, making the
question of retroactive application moot. Nevertheless, even if, arguendo, a higher court should
find Estrada announced a new rule of law, it would not have retroactive application to cases on
collateral review under the general rule announced in Teague as it does not fall within either of
the two exceptions that allow retroactive application of a new rule on collateral review.

I
I
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ORDER
It is hereby the finding of the Court that Petitioner Vavold's post conviction claims is
hereby S U ' A R I L Y DISMISSED as untimely.

Dated this

I
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day of April 2008.
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The Appellant, Jerry V. Vavold, through counsel, requests this Court waive the payment
of the Clerk's Record fee for apped in this matter. As grounds, counsel states that Mi. Vavold
has been incarcerated on the underlying criminal offense sinceNovember 16, 1999, his
sentencing date. Mr. Vavold originally retained counsel for the purposes of the criminal case,
but Mr. Vavold's financial coildition has materially changed since that case concluded. Mr.
Vavold has been incarcerated and unable to earn any significant income. His family has
assumed responsibility for counsel in order for Mr. Vavold to pursue this appeal.
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This motion is also supported by the Affidavit of Jerry Vavold to be filed in support of
this Motion within ten (10) days.
Pursuant to Idaho Code $19-4904, Mr. Vavold requests this Court enter its order waiving
the payment of fees for the clerk's record and reporter's transcript
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Respondent. )
PLEASE TAJE NOTICE that the Appellant, Jeny V.Vavold, Eles his Notice of Appeal
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (a).

1. Appeal is taken from the Second District Court, Nez Perce County, the I-Ionorable Jeff
M. Biudie, presiding.
2. The title and case number is as above.
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3. R e Appellant is Jerry V. Vavold represented by Teresa A. Hampton. The
Respondent is the State of Idaho represented by the Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney's
Office.
4. The appeal is taken from the Judgment ehtered on April 9,2008 denying post-

conviction relief.
5. The preliminary statement of issues includes the District Court comnlitted error by

failing to retroactively apply Esbadav. State, 143 Idaho 558 (2006), and dismissing Appellant's
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief alleging a violation of Appellant's Fi& and S i x t h
Amendment right when trial counsel failed to advise him of his right to remain silent at the court
ordered psychosexual evaluation. As provided in Idaho Appellate Rule 17 (9, the Appellant
may assert other issues on appeal upon W e r review.
6. This appeal is taken as a matter of right pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 1I. (a)(l).
I

I

7. Transcript: A hea6ng was held in the matter on February 27,2008 and is requested.
8. Record: Appellant requests that the Clerk's Record include the following:

a. Standard record pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 28 @)(I)

9. The undersigned hereby certifies as follows:

a. Notice of Appeal has been served by first class mail on May
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Idaho Attorney General's Office
Appeals Division
P.O. Box 83720
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Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney's Ofice
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Facsimile: 2081287-7709
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b. Appellant is not required to certify payment of estimated fees for the Clerk's

Record or Reporter's T~anscriptat this time. A request for exemption has been made to the

District Court.
DATED this
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THIS COURT, having considered the Motion to Waive Payment of Fees for Clerk's
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Idaho Code 519-4904, fees for the preparation
of the clerk's record and reporter's transcript are hereby waived.
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STATE OF IDAHO,
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CASE NO. CV07-02472

)

1
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AMENDED NOTICE
NOTICE OF APPEAL

THE STATE OF IDAHO. NEZ PERCE COUNTY PROSECUTING
ATTORNEY, ATTORNEY FORTHE STATE; JEFF M. BRUDLE,
JUDGE; LINDA CARLTON, COURT REPORTER. AND CLERK
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Appellant, Jerry V. Vavold, files his Notice of Appeal

pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (a).

1. Appeal is taken from the Second District Court, Nez Perce County, the Honorable Jeff

M. Brudie, presiding.
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1
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2. The title and case number is as above.
3. The Appellant is Jerry V. Vavold represented by Teresa A. Hampton. The
Respondent is the State of Idaho represented by the Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney's
Office.

4. The appeal is taken from the Judgment entered on April 9,2008 denying postconviction relief.
5. The preliminary statement of issues includes the District Court committed error by

failing to retroactively apply Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558 (20061, and dismissing Appellant's
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief alleging a violation of Appellant's Fifkh and Sixth
Amendment right when trial counsel failed to advise him of his right to remain silent at the court
ordered psychosexual evaluation. As provided in Idaho Appellate Rule 17 (f), the Appellant
may assert other issues on appeal upon further review.
6. This appeal is taken as a matter of right pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (aj(1).
7. Transcript: A hearing was held iii the matier on February 27,2008 and is requested.
8. Record: Appellant requests that the Clerk's Record include the following:
a. Standard record pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 28 (bj(1).
9. The undersigned hereby certifies as follows:
a. The Amended Notice of Appeal has been served by first class mail on June

L,
2008 upon:
Idaho Attorney General's Office
Appeals Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2

Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney's Office
P.O. Box 1267
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Facsimile: 2081287-7709
Linda Carlton
Court Reporter
425 Warner
Lewiston. ID 83501
Honorable Jeff Brudie
Nez Perce County Courthouse
P.O. Box 896
Lewiston. ID 83501

b. Appellant is not required to certify payment of estimated fees for the Clerk's
Record or Reporter's Transcript at this time. A request for exemption has been made to the

r

District Court and an Order granting the waiver was issuefi by'the District Court.
DATED this

% day of June, 2008.
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

JERRY E. VAVOLD,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF IDAHO,

Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO. 35339

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

I, DeAnna P. Grimm, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of
the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for
the County of Nez Perce, do hereby certify that the foregoing
Clerk's Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound
by me and contains true and correct copies of all pleadings,
documents, and papers designated to be included under Rule 28,
Idaho Appellate Rules, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of CrossAppeal, and additional documents that were requested.
I further certify:
1.

That no exhibits were marked for identification or

admitted into evidence during the course of this action.
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
the seal of said court this

22

day of July 2008.

PATTY

. .,~, , By
..,,.
;~.
.1 i

0.

WEEKS, Clerk

,

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE

JERRY E. VAVOLD,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO. 3 5 3 3 9

)
)
)
)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

)
)
)
)

Respondent.

I, DeAnna P. Grimm, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of
the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for
the County of Nez Perce, do hereby certify that copies of the
Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript were placed in the
United States mail and addressed to Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney
General, P. 0. Box 8 3 7 2 0 , Boise, Idaho 8 3 7 2 0 - 0 0 1 0 and Tere
Hampton, 9 1 2 N 8Ch St., Boise, ID

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

8 3 7 0 2 this

Y of

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
the seal of the said Court this

day of
PATTY 0 . WEEKS
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

Deputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

